We study the algorithmics of information structure design -a.k.a. persuasion or signaling -in a fundamental special case introduced by Arieli and Babichenko: multiple agents, binary actions, and no inter-agent externalities. Unlike prior work on this model, we allow many states of nature. We assume that the principal's objective is a monotone set function, and study the problem both in the public signal and private signal models, drawing a sharp contrast between the two in terms of both e cacy and computational complexity.
INTRODUCTION
Information structure design studies how beliefs in uence behavior, both of individuals and of groups, and how to shape those beliefs in order to achieve desired outcomes. e key object of study here is the information structure, which describes "who knows what" about the parameters governing the payo function of a game of incomplete information. ese parameters, collectively termed the state of nature, encode uncertainty in the environment, and their prior distribution together with the information structure determine agents' equilibrium behavior.
When studied descriptively, information structures lend structural insight into the space of potential equilibria of a game of incomplete information (termed Bayes correlated equilibria in [6] ), and can provide answers to comparative statics questions regarding the provision or withholding commitment arises organically at equilibrium if the sender and receiver(s) interact repeatedly over a long horizon, in which case commitment can be thought of as a proxy for "establishing credibility. "
If one permits commitment by the sender, restricts a ention to a common prior distribution, and postulates that receiver(s) are not privately informed through channels not controlled by the sender, then the model of [22] is the special case of persuasion for a single receiver, and the model of [3] is the special case of persuasion for multiple receivers with binary actions and no externalities. Viewed this way, both are fundamental special cases of the general information structure design problem, meaningfully restricted. It is thus only ing that they be thoroughly explored via an algorithmic lens, en-route to a more general understanding of the algorithmics of information in multi-agent se ings. A computational study of the single-receiver Bayesian persuasion model of [22] was undertaken by Dughmi and Xu [18] . As for multi-agent persuasion with binary actions and no externalities, a partial algorithmic understanding is provided by [3, 4] in the special case of a binary state of nature, and this paper picks up there.
Context: Private and Public Persuasion
At their most general, signaling schemes can reveal di erent information to di erent receivers, through private communication channels. Such schemes play a dual role: they inform receivers, possibly asymmetrically, and they coordinate their behavior by correlating the information provided. In some se ings, however, such private communication channels are unrealistic, and the sender is constrained to a public communication channel. Work on both descriptive and prescriptive questions regarding information structure design in multi-agent se ings can be classi ed along these lines, and the extent to which a public communication channel limits the sender's powers of persuasion is a fundamental question which has not been thoroughly explored.
Much of the earlier work on information structure design, in particular its computational aspects, focused on public signaling models. is includes work on signaling in auctions [8, 17, 19, 21] , voting [2] , routing [7] , and abstract game models [7, 14, 15, 25] . e work of [14] is relevant to this paper, in that they identify conditions under which public persuasion problems are tractable to approximate, and prove impossibility results in some cases where those conditions are violated. Our hardness proof in Section 6 is in part based on some of their ideas.
Private persuasion has been less thoroughly explored, particularly through the computational lens. e space of (private channel) information structures is studied by Bergemann and Morris [6] , who observe that these information structures and their associated equilibria form a generalization of correlated equilibria, and term the generalization the Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE). e space of BCEs is characterized in two-agent two-action games by [26] . Moreover, recent work explores private persuasion in the context of voting [5, 13, 27] .
Arieli and Babichenko [3] pose the model we consider in this paper, with the goal of studying private persuasion. We believe that their model wisely simpli es the general multi-agent persuasion problem by removing the most thorny aspect limiting progress in the study of private schemes: externalities. Speci cally, by assuming that receivers only in uence each others' payo s through the choices of the sender, they sidestep the equilibrium selection and computation concerns which would arise in more general se ings. Assuming a binary state of nature, Arieli and Babichenko [3] provide explicit characterizations of the optimal private signaling scheme for three of the most natural classes of sender objective functions: viewing the sender's objective as a set function on receivers, those are supermodular, anonymous monotone submodular, and supermajority functions. In all three cases, their characterization can be easily converted to an e cient algorithm. Moreover Arieli and Babichenko [3] provide necessary and su cient conditions under which public signaling schemes match the performance of private signaling schemes. In follow-up work, Babichenko Barman [4] also consider the binary state se ing, and reduce the private persuasion problem to the problem of computing the concave closure of the sender's utility function. is connection yields a (1 − 1 e − ϵ )-approximate private signaling scheme for monotone submodular utility functions, and an optimal private scheme for anonymous utility functions. Moreover, they show that the former approximation result is almost tight, assuming P N P.
Our Results and Techniques
In Section 3, we examine private signaling in our model in the presence of many states of nature. When the sender's set-function objective is monotone non-decreasing, and the prior distribution is given as input, we show the polynomial-time equivalence of optimal (private) persuasion and the algorithmic problem of maximizing the sender's objective function plus an additive function (subject to no constraints). 1 e proof relies on a linear programming formulation of private persuasion, LP duality, and the equivalence of separation and optimization. is leads to polynomial-time persuasion algorithms when the sender's objective is anonymous or supermodular. Our results here are similar to the line of research on optimal mechanism design [9] [10] [11] , in that both relate economic design problems with Bayesian incentive constraints to purely algorithmic problems. However, our techniques are di erent from those in [9] [10] [11] .
Next, we consider a sender with a monotone submodular objective, and e ciently compute a private signaling scheme which is (1 − 1 e )-approximately optimal for the sender, modulo an arbitrarily small additive ϵ. is generalizes the result of [4] from two states of nature to many states, modulo the additive loss. e techniques used in [4] do not appear to help in the presence of many states of nature, since they are tied to several structural properties which only hold in the case of a binary state. erefore, our algorithm uses a di erent approach, and crucially relies on a new structural property of (approximately) optimal private signaling schemes. Speci cally, we prove that there always exists an ϵ-optimal "simple" private signaling scheme which is a uniform mixture of polynomially many deterministic schemes, i.e., a scheme that deterministically sends a signal to each receiver upon receiving a state of nature. Notably, this property only depends on the monotonicity of the sender's utility function, and does not rely on submodularity. Using this property, we then use ideas from the literature on submodular function optimization to compute a (1 − 1 e )-approximation to the best "simple" scheme. We note that our algorithmic results from Sections 3 and 4 can be approximately extended to the sample oracle model, in which our algorithm is only given sample access to the prior distribution, using ideas from [18] . e resulting schemes su er an arbitrarily small additive loss in the sender's objective and in persuasiveness of their recommendations, and this loss is unavoidable for information theoretic reasons.
In Section 5, we examine private signaling in the special case with two states of nature and a monotone submodular objective. We give a simple and explicit construction of a polynomial-time private signaling scheme that serves as a (1 − 1 e )-approximation to the optimal scheme, which is the best possible assuming P N P as shown by [4] . is result simpli es, and slightly strengthens, a result of [4] . Moreover, the constructed private scheme has the following distinctive properties: (i) it is independent in that it signals independently to each receiver in each of the two states of nature; (ii) it is oblivious in the sense that it does not depend on the sender's utility function, and the approximation ratio is guaranteed so long as the function is monotone submodular. To obtain this result, we rst use the idea of the correlation gap [1] to argue that there always exists an independent signaling scheme which is a (1 − 1 e ) approximation to the optimal private scheme. We then exploit the fact that there are two states of nature to argue that our scheme is the optimal independent scheme, simultaneously for all monotone objectives. We then show two respects in which this result cannot generalize to many states of nature. First, we show that it is NP-hard to obtain a (1 − 1 e )-approximation to the best independent signaling scheme in multi-state se ings. Second, we show that oblivious schemes cannot guarantee more than a 1 √ m−1 fraction of the optimal sender utility where m > 1 is the number of states of nature.
Finally, in Section 6, we consider public signaling in our model, and present two negative results. First, we show via a simple example that the optimal private scheme can outperform the optimal public scheme, in terms of maximizing the sender's objective, by a polynomial factor. Second, we employ a reduction from an NP-hard graph coloring promise problem to rule out an algorithm for approximating the optimal public scheme to within any constant factor, and also to rule out an additive PTAS for the problem.
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Basic Setup
As in [3] , we consider the special case of multi-agent persuasion with binary actions, no inter-agent externalities, and a monotone objective function. Here, we adopt the perspective of sender facing n receivers. Each receiver has two actions, which we denote by 0 and 1. e receiver's payo depends only on his own action and a random state of nature θ supported on Θ. In particular, we use u i (θ, 1) and u i (θ, 0) to denote receiver i's utility for action 1 and action 0, respectively, at the state of nature θ ; as shorthand, we use u i (θ ) = u i (θ, 1) − u i (θ, 0) to denote how much receiver i prefers action 1 over action 0 given state of nature θ . Note that u i (θ ) may be negative. e sender's utility (our objective) is a function of all the receivers' actions and the state of nature θ . We use f θ (S ) to denote the sender's utility when the state of nature is θ and S is the set of receivers who choose action 1. We assume throughout the paper that f θ is a monotone non-decreasing set function for every θ . For convenience in stating our approximation guarantees, we assume without loss of generality that f θ is normalized so that f θ (∅) = 0 and f θ (S ) ∈ [0, 1] for all θ ∈ Θ and S ⊆ [n].
As is typical in information structure design, we assume that θ is drawn from a common prior distribution λ, that the sender has access to the realized state of nature, and that the sender can publicly commit to a policy-termed a signaling scheme -for mapping the realized state of nature to a signal for each receiver. e signaling scheme may be randomized, and hence reveals noisy partial information regarding the state of nature. e order of events is as follows: (1) e sender commits to a signaling scheme φ; (2) Nature draws θ ∼ λ; (3) Signals (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∼ φ(θ ) are drawn, and each receiver i receives the signal σ i ; (4) Receivers select their actions.
A general signaling scheme permits sending di erent signals to di erent receivers through a private communication channel -we term these private signaling schemes to emphasize this generality. We also study the special case of public signaling schemes -these are restricted to a public communication channel, and hence send the same signal to all receivers. We discuss these two signaling models in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, including the equilibrium concept and the induced sender optimization problem for each. In both cases, we are primarily interested in the optimization problem faced by the sender in step (1), the goal of which is to maximize the sender's expected utility. When φ yields expected sender utility within an additive [multiplicative] ϵ of the best possible, we say it is ϵ-optimal [ϵ-approximate] in the additive [multiplicative] sense.
Private Signaling Schemes
A private signaling scheme φ is a randomized map from the set of states of nature Θ to a set of signal pro les Σ = Σ 1 × Σ 2 ... × Σ n , where Σ i is the signal set of receiver i. We use φ(θ, σ ) to denote the ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2017.
Session 5b: Information Games EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA probability of selecting the signal pro le σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ Σ given a state of nature θ . erefore, σ ∈Σ φ(θ, σ ) = 1 for every θ . With some abuse of notation, we use φ(θ ) to denote the random signal pro le selected by the scheme φ given the state θ . Moreover, for each θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ [n], and σ i ∈ Σ i , we use φ i (θ, σ i ) = Pr[φ i (θ ) = σ i ] to denote the marginal probability that receiver i receives signal σ i in state θ . An algorithm implements a signaling scheme φ if it takes as input a state of nature θ , and samples the random variable φ(θ ).
Given a signaling scheme φ, each signal σ i ∈ Σ i for receiver i is realized with probability Pr(σ i ) = θ ∈Θ λ(θ )φ i (θ, σ i ). Upon receiving σ i , receiver i performs a Bayesian update and infers a posterior belief over the state of nature, as follows: the realized state is θ with posterior probability λ(θ )φ i (θ, σ i )/ Pr(σ i ). Receiver i then takes the action maximizing his posterior expected utility. In case of indi erence, we assume ties are broken in favor of the sender (i.e., in favor of action 1). erefore, receiver i chooses action 1 if 1
A simple revelation-principle style argument [3, 22] shows that there exist an optimal private signaling scheme which is direct and persuasive. By direct we mean that signals correspond to actions -in our se ing Σ i = {0, 1} for each receiver i -and can be interpreted as action recommendations. A direct scheme is persuasive if the strategy pro le where all receivers follow their recommendations forms an equilibrium of the resulting Bayesian game. 2 Due to the absence of inter-receiver externalities in our se ing, such an equilibrium would necessarily also satisfy the stronger property of being a dominant-strategy equilibrium -i.e., each receiver i maximizes his posterior expected utility by following the recommendation, regardless of whether other receivers follow their recommendations.
When designing private signaling schemes, we restrict a ention (without loss) to direct and persuasive schemes. Here, a signal pro le can be equivalently viewed as a set S ⊆ [n] of receivers -namely, the set of receivers who are recommended action 1. Using this alternative representation, a scheme can be speci ed by variables φ(θ, S ) for all θ ∈ Θ, S ⊆ [n]. We can now encode the sender's optimization problem of computing the optimal scheme using the following exponentiallylarge linear program; note the use of auxiliary variables x θ,i to denote the marginal probability of recommending action 1 to receiver i in state θ .
e second set of constraints in LP (1) are persuasiveness constraints, and state that each receiver i should maximize his utility by taking action 1 whenever that action 1 is recommended. Note that the persuasiveness constraints for action 0, which can be wri en as θ ∈Θ λ(θ )(1 − x θ,i )u i (θ ) ≤ 0 for each i ∈ [n], are intentionally omi ed from this LP. is omission is without loss when f θ is a non-decreasing set function for each θ : any solution to the LP in which a receiver prefers action 1 when recommended action 0 can be improved by always recommending action 1 to that receiver.
Public Signaling Schemes
A public signaling scheme π can be viewed as a special type of private signaling schemes in which each receiver must receive the same signal, i.e., only a public signal is sent. Overloading the notation of Section 2.2, we use Σ to denote the set of public signals and σ ∈ Σ to denote a public signal. A public signaling scheme π is fully speci ed by {π (θ, σ )} θ,σ , where π (θ, σ ) denotes the probability of sending signal σ at state θ . Upon receiving a signal σ , each receiver performs the same Bayesian update and infers a posterior belief over the state of nature, as follows: the realized state is θ with probability λ(θ )π (θ, σ )/ Pr(σ ), where Pr(σ ) = θ ∈Θ π (θ, σ ). is induces a subgame for each signal σ , one in which all receivers share the same belief regarding the state of nature.
Whereas in more general se ings than ours receivers may play a mixed Nash equilibrium in each subgame, our restriction to a se ing with no externalities removes this complication. Given a posterior distribution on states of nature (say, one induced by a signal σ ), our receivers face disjoint single-agent decision problems, each of which admits an optimal pure strategy. We assume that receivers break ties in favor of the sender (speci cally, in favor of action 1), which distinguishes a unique pure response for each receiver. erefore, our solution concept here distinguishes a unique action pro le for each posterior distribution, and hence for each signal. A simple revelationprinciple style argument then allows us to conclude that there is an optimal public signaling schemes which is direct, meaning that the public signals are action pro les, and persuasive, meaning that in the subgame induced by signal σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) each receiver i's optimal decision problem (which breaks ties in favor of action 1) solves to action σ i .
Restricting a ention to direct and persuasive public signaling schemes, each signal can also be viewed as a subset S ⊆ [n] of receivers taking action 1. e sender's optimization problem can then be wri en as the following exponentially-large linear program.
e rst set of constraints are persuasiveness constraints corresponding to action 1. Note that the persuasiveness constraints for action 0, which can be wri en as θ ∈Θ λ(θ )π (θ, S ) · u i (θ ) ≤ 0 for each S ⊆ [n] and i S, are intentionally omi ed from this LP. is omission is without loss when f θ is non-decreasing for each state θ : if signal S with i S is such that receiver i prefers action 1 in the resulting subgame, then we can replace it with the signal S ∪ i without degrading the sender's utility. We remark that LP (2) and LP (1) only di er in their persuasiveness constraints.
Input Models
We distinguish two input models for describing persuasion instances in this paper. e rst is the explicit model, in which the prior distribution λ is given explicitly as a probability vector. e second is the sample oracle model, where Θ and λ are provided implicitly through sample access to λ. In both models, we assume that given a state of nature θ , we can e ciently evaluate u i (θ ) for each i ∈ [n] and f θ (S ) for each S ⊆ [n]. In the explicit input model, by computing a signaling scheme φ (whether private or public) we mean that we explicitly list the non-zero variables φ(θ, S ) on which the scheme is supported. In the implicit model, computing a signaling scheme φ (whether 1:8 Shaddin Dughmi and Haifeng Xu private or public) amounts to providing an algorithm which takes as input a state of nature θ , and samples the random variable φ(θ ).
Set Functions and Submodularity
Given a nite ground set X , a set function is a map f :
We also consider continuous functions G from the solid hypercube [0, 1] X to the real numbers.
(coordinate wise), and smooth submodular (in the sense of [12] ) if its second partial derivatives exist and are non-positive everywhere.
e Multilinear Extension of a Set Function. Given any set function f : 2 X → R, the multilinear extension of f is the continuous function F : [0, 1] X → R de ned as follows:
Notice that, F (x ) can be viewed as the expectation of f (S ) when the random set S independently includes each element i with probability x i . In particular, let p I x denote the independent distribution with marginals x, de ned by p I
For our results, we will need to maximize F (x ) subject to a set of linear constraints on x. is problem is NP-hard in general, yet can be approximated by the continuous greedy process of Calinescu et al. [12] for fairly general families of constraints. Note that though we cannot exactly evaluate F (x ) in polynomial time, it is su cient to approximate F (x ) within a good precision in order to apply the continuous greedy process. By an additive FPTAS evaluation oracle for F , we mean an algorithm that evaluates F (x ) within additive error ϵ in poly(n, 1 ϵ ) time.
T 2.1 (A [12] ). Let F : [0, 1] n → [0, 1] be a non-negative, monotone, smooth submodular function. Let P ⊆ [0, 1] n be a down-monotone polytope 3 , speci ed explicitly by its linear constraints. Given an additive FPTAS evaluation oracle for F , there is a poly(n, 1
Correlation Gap. A general de nition of the correlation gap can be found in [1] . For our results, the following simple de nition will su ce. Speci cally, for any x ∈ [0, 1] X , let D(x ) be the set of all distributions p over 2 X with xed marginal probability Pr S ∼p (i ∈ S ) = x i for all i. Let p I x , as de ned above, be the independent distribution with marginal probabilities x. Note that p I x ∈ D(x ). For any set function f (S ), the correlation gap κ is de ned as follows:
Loosely speaking, the correlation gap upper bounds the "loss" of the expected function value over a random set by ignoring the correlation in the randomness.
). e correlation gap κ is upper bounded by e e−1 for any non-negative monotone non-decreasing submodular function. In this section, we relate the computational complexity of private persuasion to the complexity of maximizing the sender's objective function, and show that the optimal private signaling scheme can be computed e ciently for a broad class of sender objectives. Let F denote any collection of monotone set functions. We use I (F ) to denote the class of all persuasion instances in our model in which the sender utility function f θ is in F for all states of nature θ . We restrict a ention to the explicit input model for most of this discussion, though discuss how to extend our results to the sample oracle model, modulo an arbitrarily small additive loss in both the sender's objective and the persuasiveness constraints, at the end of this section. e following theorem establishes the polynomial-time equivalence between computing the optimal private signaling scheme and the problem of maximizing the objective function plus an additive function. Note that although the number of variables in LP (1) is exponential in the number of receivers, a vertex optimal solution of this LP is supported on O (n|Θ|) variables. 
P
. We rst reduce optimal private signaling to maximizing the objective function plus an additive function, via linear programming duality. In particular, consider the following dual program of LP (1) 
We can obtain a separation oracle for LP (5) given an algorithm for maximizing f θ (S ) plus an additive function. Given any variables w θ,i , α i , θ , separation over the rst set of constraints reduces to maximizing the set function θ (S ) = f θ (S ) − 1 λ(θ ) i ∈S w θ,i for each θ ∈ Θ. e other constraints can be checked directly in linear time. Given the resulting separation oracle, we can use the Ellipsoid method to obtain a vertex optimal solution to both LP (5) and its dual LP (1) in polynomial time [20] .
We now prove the converse. Namely, we construct a polynomial-time Turing reduction from the problem of maximizing f plus an additive function to a private signaling problem in I (F ). At a high level, we rst reduce the set function maximization problem to a certain linear program, and then prove that solving the dual of the linear program reduces to optimal private signaling for a set of particularly constructed instances in I (F ).
Given f ∈ F and weights w, our reduction concerns the following linear program, parameterized by a = (a 1 , ..., a n ) and b, with variables z = (z 1 , ..., z n ) and .
Let P denote the feasible region of LP (6) . As the rst step of our reduction, we reduce maximizing the set function w (S ) = f (S ) + i ∈S w i to the separation problem for P. Let z i = −w i for each i.
Notice that (z, ) is feasible (i.e., in P) if and only if ≥ max S ⊆[n] f (S ) − i ∈S z i . erefore, we can binary search for a value such that (z, ) is almost feasible, but not quite. More precisely, let B denote the bit complexity of the f (S )'s and the w i 's, then binary search returns the exact optimal value of the set function maximization problem a er O(B) steps. We then set to equal 1:10 Shaddin Dughmi and Haifeng Xu that value minus 2 −B . Feeding (z, ) to the separation oracle, we obtain a violated constraint which must correspond to the maximizer of f (S ) + i ∈S w i . As the second step of our reduction, we reduce the separation problem for P to solving LP (6) for every choice of objective coe cients a and b. is polynomial-time Turing reduction follows from the equivalence of separation and optimization [20] .
ird, we reduce solving LP (6) for arbitrary a and b to the special case where a ∈ [0, 1] n and b = 1. e reduction involves a case analysis. (a) If any of the objective coe cients are negative, then the fact that P is upwards closed implies that LP (6) is unbounded. (b) If b = 0 and a i > 0 for some i, then the LP is unbounded since we can make arbitrarily small and z i arbitrarily large. Normalizing by dividing by b, we have reduced the problem to the case when b = 1 and a 0 (coordinate-wise). (c) Now suppose that a i > 1 = b for some i; the LP is unbounded by making z i arbitrarily small and arbitrarily large. is analysis leaves the case of b = 1 and a ∈ [0, 1] n .
Fourth, we reduce LP (6) with parameters a ∈ [0, 1] n and b = 1 to its dual shown below, with variables p S for S ⊆ [n].
We note that LP (7) is not the standard dual of LP (6); in particular the rst set of constraints are inequality rather than equality constraints. It is easy to see that LP (7) is equivalent to the standard dual when f is monotone non-decreasing, and that an optimal solution to one of the two duals can be easily converted to an optimal solution of the other. e h and nal step of our reduction will reduce LP (7) to a private signaling problem in I (F ). ere are n receivers and two states of nature θ 0 , θ 1 with λ(θ 0 ) = λ(θ 1 ) = 1/2. De ne u i (θ 1 ) = 1 and u i (θ 0 ) = − 1 a i (−∞ if a i = 0) for all i. e sender's utility function satis es f θ 1 = f θ 0 = f . Let φ * be an optimal signaling scheme, in particular an optimal solution to the instantiation of LP (1) for our instance. Note that all receivers prefer action 1 in state θ 1 ; therefore, it is easy to see that φ * can be weakly improved, without violating the persuasiveness constraints, by modifying it to always recommend action 1 to all receivers when in state θ 1 . A er this modi cation, φ * is an optimal solution to the following LP, which optimizes over all signaling schemes satisfying φ(θ 1 , [n]) = 1.
It is now easy to see that se ing p S = φ * (θ 0 , S ) yields an optimal solution to LP (7) As an immediate corollary of eorem 3.1, the optimal private signaling scheme can be computed e ciently when the sender's objective function is supermodular or anonymous. Recall that a set function f : 2 [n] → R is anonymous if there exists a function : Z → R such that f (S ) = (|S |). 3.2. ere is a polynomial time algorithm for computing the optimal private signaling scheme when the sender objective functions are either supermodular or anonymous.
. Since a supermodular function plus an additive function is still supermodular, and the problem of unconstrained supermodular maximization can be solved in polynomial time, eorem 3.1 implies that the optimal private signaling scheme can also be computed in polynomial time. As for anonymous objectives, there is a simple algorithm for maximizing an anonymous set function Observe that xing |S | = k, the optimal set S k corresponds to the k highest-weight elements in w. Enumerating all k and choosing the best S k yields the optimal set.
Finally, we make two remarks on eorem 3.1, particularly on the reduction from optimal private signaling to set function maximization. First, we note that the assumption of monotonicity is not necessary to the reduction from signaling to optimization. In other words, even without the monotonicity assumption for the sender's objective function, one can still e ciently compute the optimal private signaling scheme for instances in I (F ) given access to an oracle for maximizing f (S ) + i ∈S w i for any f ∈ F and weight vector w.
is can be veri ed by adding back the persuasiveness constraints for action 0 to LP (1) and examining the corresponding dual, which has similar structure to LP (5) . We omit the trivial details here. Consequently, Corollary 3.2 applies to non-monotone supermodular or anonymous functions as well.
Second, our reduction assumes that the prior distribution λ over the state of nature is explicitly given. is can be generalized to the sample oracle model. In particular, when our only access to λ is through random sampling, we can implement an ϵ-optimal and ϵ-persuasive 4 private signaling scheme in pol (n, 1 ϵ ) time using an idea from [18] (assuming u i (θ ) ∈ [−1, 1]). e algorithm is as follows: given any input state θ , we rst take pol (n, 1 ϵ ) samples from λ, and then solve LP (1) on the empirical distribution of the samples plus θ , with relaxed (by ϵ) persuasiveness constraints. Finally, we signal for θ as the solution to the LP suggests. e analysis of this algorithm is very similar to that in [18] , thus is omi ed here. Moreover, the bi-criteria loss is inevitable in this oracle model due to information theoretic reasons [18] .
PRIVATE SIGNALING WITH SUBMODULAR OBJECTIVES
In this section we consider optimal private signaling for submodular sender objectives, and show that there is a polynomial time (1 − 1 e )-approximation scheme, modulo an additive loss of ϵ. is is almost the best possible: Babichenko and Barman [4] show that even in the special case of two states of nature, it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal private signaling scheme within a factor be er than (1 − 1 e ) for monotone submodular sender objectives. T 4.1. Consider private signaling with monotone submodular sender objectives. Let OPT denote the optimal sender utility. For any ϵ > 0, a private signaling scheme achieving expected sender utility at least (1 − 1 e )OPT − ϵ can be implemented in poly(n, |Θ|, 1 ϵ ) time.
e main technical challenge in proving eorem 4.1 is that a private signaling scheme may have exponentially large support, as apparent from linear program (1). To overcome this di culty, we prove a structural characterization of (approximately) optimal persuasive private schemes, i.e., solutions to LP (1). Roughly speaking, we show that LP (1) always has an approximately optimal solution with polynomial-sized support and nicely structured distributions. is greatly narrows down the solution space we need to search over. Recall that for any θ , φ(θ ) is a random variable supported on 2 [n] . We say φ(θ ) is K-uniform if it follows a uniform distribution on a multiset of size K. e following lemma exhibits a structural property regarding (approximately) optimal solutions to LP (1) . Notably, this property only depends on monotonicity of the sender's objective functions and does not depend on submodularity. Its proof is postponed to the end of this section. 4 is is the natural relaxation of persuasiveness. In our se ing, a receiver approximately maximizes his posterior expected payo , to within an additive ϵ , by following the scheme's recommendation.
is is regardless of the actions of other receivers. . By Lemma 4.2, we can, without much loss, restrict our design of φ(θ ) to the special class of K-uniform distributions. Note that a K-uniform distribution φ(θ ) can be described by variables
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, where x j θ,i denotes the recommended action to receiver i in the j'th pro le in the support of φ(θ ). Relaxing our variables to lie in [0, 1], this leads to optimization problem (9) 
As a high level, our algorithm rst approximately solves Program (9) and then signals according to its solution. Details are in Algorithm 1, which we instantiate with ϵ > 0 and K = 108n log(2n |Θ |)
where p I x is the independent distribution over 2 [n] with marginal probability x, the expected sender utility induced by the signaling scheme in Algorithm 1 is precisely the objective value of Program (9) at the obtained solution. eorem 4.1 then follows from two claims: 1. e optimal objective value of Program (9) is ϵ-close to the optimal sender utility (Claim 4.3 ); 2. e continuous greedy process [12] can be applied to Program (9) to e ciently compute a (1 − 1/e)-approximate solution, modulo a small additive loss (Claim 4.4). We remark that eorem 4.1 can be generalized to the sample oracle model, but with an additional ϵ-loss in persuasiveness constraints (assuming u i (θ ) ∈ [−1, 1]), using the idea from [18] . , the optimal objective value of Program (9) is at least OPT − ϵ, where OPT is the optimal sender utility in private signaling.
P
. By Lemma 4.2, there exists a private signaling scheme φ such that: (i) φ achieves sender utility at least OPT − ϵ; (ii) for each θ , there exists K sets S 1 θ , ..., S K θ ⊆ [n] such that φ θ is a uniform distribution over {S 1 θ , ..., S K θ }. Utilizing φ, we can construct a feasible solution x to Program (9) with objective value at least OPT − ϵ. In particular, let x j θ ∈ {0, 1} n be the indicator vector of the set S j θ , formally de ned as follows: x j θ,i = 1 if and only if i ∈ S j θ . By referring to the feasibility of φ to LP (1), it is easy to check that x j θ,i 's are feasible to Program (9) . Moreover, since F θ (x j θ ) = f θ (S j θ ), the objective value of Program (9) Session 5b: Information Games EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA solution φ, which is at least OPT − ϵ. erefore, the optimal objective value of Program (9) is at least OPT − ϵ, as desired. C 4.4. ere is an algorithm that runs in poly(n, |Θ|, K, 1 ϵ ) time and computes a (1 − 1/e)approximate solution, modulo an additive loss of ϵ/e, to Program (9).
. e objective function of Program (9) is a linear combination, with non-negative coecients, of multilinear extensions of monotone submodular functions, thus is smooth, monotone and submodular. Moreover, the function value can be evaluated within error ϵ by poly(n, 1 ϵ ) random samples, thus in poly(n, 1 ϵ ) time. To apply eorem 2.1, we only need to prove that the feasible region is a down-monotone polytope. Observe that there always exists an optimal solution to Program (9) such that x θ,i = 1 for any θ, i such that u i (θ ) ≥ 0. erefore, w.l.o.g., we can pre-set these variables to be 1 and view the program as an optimization problem over x θ,i 's for all θ, i such that u i (θ ) < 0. It is easy to check that these x θ,i 's form a down-monotone polytope determined by polynomially many constraints, as desired.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
Our proof is based on the probabilistic method. Recall that the optimal private signaling scheme can be computed by solving the exponentially-large LP (1). Roughly speaking, given any optimal private scheme φ * , we will take polynomially many samples from φ * (θ ) for each θ , and prove that with strictly positive probability the corresponding empirical distributions form a solution to LP (1) that is close to optimality. However, the sampling approach usually su ers from ϵ-loss in both the objective and persuasiveness constraints. It turns out that the ϵ-loss to persuasiveness constraints can be avoided in our se ing with carefully designed pre-processing steps.
At a high level, to get rid of the ϵ-loss in persuasiveness constraints, there are two main technical barriers. e rst is to handle the estimation error in the receiver's utilities, which is inevitable due to sampling. We address this by adjusting the φ * to strengthen the persuasiveness constraints so that a small estimation error would still preserve the original persuasiveness constraints. e second barrier arises when some x * θ,i 's are smaller than inverse polynomial of the precision ϵ, then pol ( 1 ϵ ) samples cannot guarantee a good multiplicative estimate of x * θ,i . We deal with this issue by making "honest" recommendation, i.e., action 0, at these cases, and show that such modi cation will not cause much loss to our objective.
We rst introduce some convenient notations. For any receiver i, let set Θ + i = {θ : u i (θ ) ≥ 0} be the set of states at which receiver i (weakly) prefers action 1; Similarly, Θ − i = {θ : u i (θ ) < 0} be the set of states at which receiver i prefers action 0. Moreover, for any state of nature θ , let I + θ = {i : u i (θ ) ≥ 0} be the set of receivers who (weakly) prefer action 1 at state θ . It would be convenient to think of {Θ + i } i ∈[n] and {I + θ } θ ∈Θ as two di erent partitions of the set {(θ, i) : u i (θ ) ≥ 0}. Observe that by monotonicity there always exists an optimal signaling scheme φ * such that x * θ,i = 1 for every θ ∈ Θ + i . Let φ * be such an optimal signaling scheme and OPT denote the optimal sender utility. We now adjust the scheme φ * such that they do not degrade the objective value by much but is more suitable for applying concentration bounds for our probabilistic argument. Note that x * θ,i < ϵ 3n only when θ ∈ Θ − i , i.e., action 0 is the best action for receiver i conditioned on θ . We rst adjust φ * to obtain a new scheme φ, as follows: φ is the same as φ * except that for every θ, i such that x * θ,i < ϵ 3n , φ always recommends action 0 to receiver i given the state of nature θ . As a result, x θ,i equals x * θ,i whenever x * θ,i ≥ ϵ 3n and equals 0 otherwise. Note that the signaling scheme still satis es the persuasiveness constraints.
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Naturally, each adjustment above, corresponding to θ, i satisfying x * θ,i < ϵ 3n , could decrease the objective value since the marginal probability of recommending action 1 decreases. Nevertheless, this loss, denoted as L(θ, i), can be properly bounded as follows:
.
As a result, the aggregated loss of all the adjustments made in this step can be upper bounded by
at is, the objective value of φ is at least OPT − ϵ 3 . Adjustment 2: Strengthen the Persuasive Constraints by Scaling Down x θ,i 's
We now strengthen the persuasiveness constraints by further adjusting the φ obtained from above so that a small estimation error due to sampling will still maintain the original persuasiveness constraints. For any θ , we de ne φ (θ, S ) = 3 3+ϵ φ(θ, S ) for all S I + θ , and de ne φ (θ,
Obviously, φ θ is still a distribution over 2 [n] . Moreover, we claim that x θ,i = E S ∼φ θ I(i ∈ S ) = 1 whenever x θ,i = 1, i.e., θ ∈ Θ + i . at is, given state θ , any receiver i ∈ I + θ will still aways be recommended action 1. is is because, to construct φ θ , we moved some probability mass from all other sets S to the set I + θ , therefore the marginal probability of recommending action 1 to any receiver i ∈ I + θ will not decrease. However, this marginal probability is originally 1 in the solution of φ. erefore, x θ,i still equals 1 for any i ∈ I + θ , or equivalently, for any θ ∈ Θ + i . Similarly, we also have x θ,i = 0 whenever x θ,i = 0.
Let V al (φ) denote the objective value of a scheme φ. We claim that V al (φ ) ≥ OPT − 2ϵ 3 and φ satis es x θ,i = 3 3+ϵ x θ,i for every θ ∈ Θ − i . For any i ∈ [n], θ ∈ Θ − i (which means i I + θ ), we have
since the summation excludes the term φ (θ, I + θ ). We now prove the guarantee of the objective value. Observe that φ (θ, I + θ ) ≥ 3 3+ϵ φ(θ, I + θ ) also holds in our construction. erefore, we have Session 5b: Information Games EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA e above two steps of adjustment result in a feasible 2ϵ 3 -optimal solution φ to LP (1) that satis es the following properties:
Utilizing such a φ we show that there exists an ϵ-optimal solution φ to LP (1) such that the distribution φ θ is a K-uniform distribution for every θ , where K = 108n log(2n |Θ |) ϵ 3
Our proof is based on the probabilistic method. For each θ , independently take K = 108n log(2n |Θ|) ϵ 3 samples from random variable φ (θ ), and let φ θ denote the corresponding empirical distribution. Obviously, φ θ is a K-uniform distribution. We claim that with strictly positive probability over the randomness of the samples, φ is feasible to LP (1) and achieves utility at least V al (φ ) − ϵ 3 ≥ OPT −ϵ. We rst examine the objective value. Observe that the objective value V al (φ ) can be viewed as the expectation of the random variable θ ∈Θ λ(θ ) f θ (S θ ) ∈ [0, 1], where S θ follows the distribution of φ (θ ). Our sampling procedure generates K samples for the random variable {S θ } θ ∈Θ , therefore by the Hoe ding bound, with probability at least 1 − exp(−2Kϵ 2 /9) > 1 − 1/(2n|Θ|), the empirical mean is at least V al (φ ) − ϵ/3. Now we only need to show that all the persuasiveness constraints are preserved with high probability. First, observe that if x θ,i = 0, then x θ,i induced by φ also equals 0. is is because x θ,i = E S ∼φ (θ ) I(i ∈ S ) = 0 implies that i is not contained in any S from the support of φ (θ ), therefore, also not contained in any sample. Similarly, x θ,i = 1 implies x θ,i = 1. To show that all the persuasiveness constraints hold, we only need to argue that x θ,i ≤ x * θ,i for every θ ∈ Θ − i satisfying x * θ,i ≥ ϵ 3n . is holds with high probability by tail bounds. In particular, x θ,i = E S ∼φ (θ ) I(i ∈ S ) and we take K samples from φ (θ ). By the Cherno bound, with probability at least
, the empirical mean x θ,i is at most (1 + ϵ/3)x θ,i = x * θ,i . Note that there are at most n|Θ| choices of such θ, i. By union bound, with probability at least 1 − (n|Θ| + 1)/(2n|Θ|) > 0, φ satis es all the persuasiveness constraints thus is feasible to LP (1), and achieves objective value at least V al (φ ) − ϵ 3 ≥ OPT −ϵ. So there must exist a feasible ϵ-optimal solution φ to LP (1) such that φ θ is K-uniform for every θ . is concludes our proof of Lemma 4.2.
AN OBLIVIOUS PRIVATE SCHEME FOR BINARY-STATE SETTINGS
In this section, we consider the special case with two states of nature, denoted by θ 0 and θ 1 , and submodular sender utility functions. We show that a (1 − 1 e )-approximate private signaling scheme can be explicitly constructed. e approximation ratio is tight by [4] . Moreover, the constructed signaling scheme has the following distinctive properties: (i) it signals independently to each receiver, which we term an independent signaling scheme; (ii) it is oblivious in the sense that it does not depend on the sender's utility function so long as it is monotone submodular. All proofs in this section are omi ed due to space constraints, and can be found in the full version on arXiv.
In particular, we consider the independent signaling scheme φ I that simply maximizes the probability of recommending action 1 to each receiver i independently. Such a scheme can be easily constructed by alway recommending action 1 to receiver i whenever u i (θ ) ≥ 0, and recommend action 1 with probability as high as possible subject to the persuasiveness constraints. We refer the reader to the Appendix for an explicit construction. Notice that φ I is determined by the receiver's payo s, and does not depend on the sender's payo function f θ (S ). Nevertheless, the following theorem shows that φ I is approximately optimal. In the multiple-state se ing with monotone submodular sender objectives, the optimal independent signaling scheme is a (1 − 1 e )-approximation to the optimal private signaling scheme.
In the binary-state se ing with monotone sender objectives, the φ I de ned above is the optimal independent signaling scheme.
We conclude this section with two negative results regarding generalizing eorem 5.1 to many states of natures. We rst show that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal independent signaling scheme within a factor be er than (1 − 1 e ) when there are multiple states of nature (Proposition 5.4). We then prove that the best oblivious scheme can perform poorly in terms of the sender utility when there are multiple states (Proposition 5.5). P 5.4. In the multiple-state se ing with monotone submodular sender objectives, it is NP-hard to compute an independent signaling scheme that (1 − 1/e)-approximates the optimal independent scheme. P 5.5. For any integer m > 1, there exists an instance with m states of nature such that any oblivious private scheme can achieve at most 1 √ m−1 fraction of the optimal sender utility.
INEFFICACY AND HARDNESS OF PUBLIC PERSUASION
In this section, we turn our a ention to the design of optimal public signaling schemes, and show a stark contrast with private signaling, both in terms of their e cacy at optimizing the sender's utility, and in terms of their computational complexity.
We start with an example illustrating how the restriction to public signaling can drastically reduce the sender's expected utility. e example is notably simple: two states of nature, and a binary sender utility function which is independent of the state of nature. We show a multiplicative gap of Ω(n), and an additive gap of 1 − 1 Ω(n) , between the expected sender utility from the optimal private and public signaling schemes, where n is the number of receivers. Example 6.1 (Ine cacy of Public Signaling Schemes). Consider an instance with n identical receivers and two states of nature Θ = {H, L}. Each receiver has the same utility function, de ned as follows: u i (H) = 1 and u i (L) = −1, for all i. e state of nature H occurs with probability 1 n+1 , and L occurs with probability n n+1 . e sender's utility function is f θ (S ) = f (S ) = min(|S |, 1). In other words, the sender gets utility 1 precisely when at least one receiver takes action 1.
e persuasiveness constraints imply that each receiver can take action 1 with probability no more than 2 n+1 . is is achievable by always recommending action 1 to the receiver in state H, and recommending action 0 with probability 1 n in state L. e sender's expected utility depends on how these recommendations are correlated. e optimal private scheme anti-correlates the receivers' recommendations in order to guarantee that at least one receiver takes action 1 always, which achieves an expected sender utility of 1, the maximum possible. Speci cally, in state H the scheme always recommends action 1 to every receiver, and in state L the scheme chooses one receiver uniformly at random and recommends action 1 to that receiver, and action 0 to the other receivers.
We argue that no public scheme can achieve sender utility more than 2 n+1 . Indeed, since receivers are identical, our solution concept implies that they choose the same action for every realization of a public signal. erefore, the best that a public scheme can do is to recommend action 1 to all receivers simultaneously with probability 2 n+1 in aggregate, and recommend action 0 with the remaining probability, yielding an expected sender utility of 2 n+1 . is is achievable: in state H the scheme always recommends action 1 to every receiver, and in state L the scheme recommends action 1 to all receivers with probability 1 n , and action 0 to all receivers with probability 1 − 1 n .
Our next result illustrates the computational barrier to obtaining the optimal public signaling scheme, even for additive sender utility functions. Our proof is inspired by a reduction in [14] for proving the hardness of computing the best posterior distribution over Θ, a problem termed mixture selection in [14] , in a voting se ing. at reduction is from the maximum independent set problem. Since a public signaling scheme is a combination of posterior distributions, one for each signal, we require a more involved reduction from a graph-coloring problem to prove our result. n . It is NP-hard to approximate the optimal sender utility to within any constant multiplicative factor. Moreover, there is no additive PTAS for evaluating the optimal sender utility, unless P = NP.
P
. We prove by reducing from the following NP-hard problem. In particular, [23] prove that for any positive integer k, any integer q such that q ≥ 2 k + 1, and an arbitrarily small constant ϵ > 0, given an undirected graph G, it is NP-hard to distinguish between the following two cases:
• Case 1: ere is a q-colorable induced subgraph of G containing a (1 − ϵ ) fraction of all vertices, where each color class contains a 1−ϵ q fraction of all vertices. • Case 2: Every independent set in G contains less than a 1 q k +1 fraction of all vertices. Given graph G with vertices [n] = {1, . . . , n} and edges E, we will construct a public persuasion instance so that the desired algorithm for approximating the optimal sender utility can be used to distinguish these two cases. Our construction is similar to that in [14] . We let there be n receivers, and let Θ = [n]. In other words, both receivers and states of nature correspond to vertices of the graph. We x the uniform prior distribution over states of nature -i.e., the realized state of nature is a uniformly-drawn vertex in the graph. We de ne the receiver utilities as follows: u i (θ ) = 1 2 if i = θ ; u i (θ ) = −1 if (i, θ ) ∈ E; and u i (θ ) = − 1 4n otherwise. We de ne the sender's utility function, with range [0, 1], to be f θ (S ) = f (S ) = |S | n . e following claim is proven in [14] . C 6.3 ([14] ). For any distribution x ∈ ∆ Θ , the set S = {i ∈ [n] : θ ∈Θ x θ u i (θ ) ≥ 0} is an independent set of G. Claim 6.3 implies that upon receiving any public signal with any posterior distribution x over Θ, the players who take action 1 always form an independent set of G. erefore, if the graph G is from Case 2, the sender's expected utility in any public signaling scheme is at most 1 q k +1 . Now supposing that G is from Case 1, we x the corresponding coloring of (1 − ϵ )n vertices with colors k = 1, . . . , q, and we use this coloring to construct a public scheme achieving expected sender utility at least (1−ϵ ) 2 q . e scheme uses q + 1 signals, and is as follows: if θ has color k then deterministically send the signal k, and if θ is uncolored then deterministically send the signal 0. Given signal k > 0, the posterior distribution on states of nature is the uniform distribution over the vertices with color k -an independent set S k of size 1−ϵ q n. It is easy to verify that receivers i ∈ S k prefer action 1 to action 0, since θ ∈S k 1 |S k | u i (θ ) = 1 |S k | ( 1 2 − |S k |−1 4n ) > 1 4|S k | ≥ 0. erefore, the sender's utility is f (S k ) = |S k | n = 1−ϵ q whenever k > 0. Since signal 0 has probability ϵ, we conclude that the sender's expected utility is at least (1−ϵ ) 2 q , as needed. 
